In an industry where firms compete via supply functions, the set of equilibrium outcomes is large. If decreasing supply functions are ruled out, this set is reduced significantly, but remains large. Specifically, the set of prices that can be sustained by supply function equilibria is the interval between the competitive price and the Cournot price. In sharp contrast, when the number of firms is above a threshold we identify (e.g., three if demand is linear), only the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a coalition-proof supply function equilibrium. r
Introduction
We study an oligopoly where firms compete via supply functions. In this setting, each firm chooses a supply function. The supply functions of all firms are then aggregated to form the market supply which, together with the market demand, determine the market clearing price and the production of each firm. This model of competition describes many markets more realistically than the Cournot or the Bertrand models. In markets for government procurement contracts, or in the ARTICLE IN PRESS framework. Indeed, we show that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a CPSFE, and hence that in our framework a CPSFE always exists. Further, we identify conditions on the curvature of the demand and cost functions that guarantee that if the number of firms is above a threshold, the Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome. (If the market demand is a linear function, this result arises when there are three or more firms in the industry.)
Our proofs of unicity of a CPSFE outcome are based purely on Pareto dominance arguments: It turns out that when the number of firms in the industry is above a threshold, the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to every other SFE outcome; i.e., the profits of every firm at the Cournot outcome are greater than at every other SFE outcome. Thus, since the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a CPSFE, every SFE leading to an outcome other than the Cournot outcome is upset by a self enforcing deviation of the grand coalition leading to the Cournot outcome.
In proving that the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to every other SFE outcome, the class of SFE in which all but perhaps one firm supply inelastically the same fixed amount, and the remaining firm maximizes on the residual demand, plays an important role. (The set of outcomes sustained by SFE in this class can be easily characterized.) We show that for every SFE, there is a SFE in this class such that the profits (and outputs) of the firms using an inelastic supply function are greater or equal to those of the firm with the greatest profit (and output) in the original SFE. (This result indirectly establishes that SFE outcomes cannot be very asymmetric.) It turns out that if the number of firms is above a threshold, then the Cournot outcome (which can be sustained by a SFE in this class) is Pareto superior to every other outcome sustained by SFE in this class, and is therefore Pareto superior to every other SFE outcome.
It is worth noting that in the general context of non-cooperative games coalitionproof Nash equilibrium outcomes need not be Pareto optimal within the class of equilibrium outcomes. In our framework, however, the unique CPSFE outcome (i.e., the Cournot outcome) is the unique Pareto optimal outcome within the class of SFE outcomes. As a consequence, every SFE that leads to an outcome other than the Cournot outcome is vulnerable to a self-enforcing deviation of the grand coalition, and is therefore very ''unstable.'' This provides additional support for the Cournot outcome, since every SFE that leads to a different outcome is easily upset.
An interesting interpretation of our unicity result, parallel to Kreps and Scheinkman [11] , is that the Cournot model provides a ''reduced form'' of a ''structural model'' where firms compete by choosing a supply function, but can communicate prior to taking an action. As we show, when the coordination opportunities brought about by the possibility of communication are taken into account, the Cournot model yields predictions identical to those obtained using the more cumbersome model of competition via supply functions. (See also [9] on this debate.)
Supply function equilibria
In this section we describe the model of competition via supply functions, we characterize the prices that can be sustained by supply function equilibria, and we show that every SFE leading to the Cournot price yields the Cournot outcome. Further, we show that within the set of SFE outcomes the profit of the industry is uniquely maximized at the Cournot outcome.
The description of the industry, except for allowing more than two firms, is identical to that of Klemperer and Meyer [10] , and is common in the literature-see, e.g., [4, 6, 11] . As in these papers, we assume that the demand function is concave and the cost function is convex. Also we assume, as in [10] , that firms' supply functions are continuously differentiable.
These assumptions render tractable a complex model. (Note that since strategies are functions, the analysis of the game describing the industry is difficult.) Specifically, under these assumptions equilibrium outcomes are solutions to the system of equations formed by first-order conditions for profit maximization and the market clearing condition. (In a SFE every firm maximizes profits on the ''residual'' demand, effectively determining the market clearing price. Thus, if every firm chooses a convex supply function, then under the above assumptions the profit of each firm is a concave and differentiable function of the market price.) Of course, these assumptions also simplify the analysis; they imply, for example, that the Cournot equilibrium is unique and symmetric, and that the profit of the industry increases with prices below the monopoly price. These results hold, however, under weaker assumptions.
In contrast to Klemperer and Meyer [10] , we restrict the supply functions that firms can use to be non-decreasing. This restriction is appropriate for the analysis of industries where firms cannot commit to a decreasing supply schedule, or to those where decreasing supply functions are ruled out by design, as in many organized markets. In the Spanish electricity market, for example, decreasing supply functions are explicitly ruled out-see [5, 4.3.1 Simple Bids, p. 9, 4.6.1.6 Verification of the Contents of Simple Bids, p. 14]. It turns out that restricting supply functions to be non-decreasing significantly reduces the set of prices that can be sustained by SFE. The monopoly price, in particular, can no longer be sustained by SFE-the largest price that can be sustained by SFE is the Cournot price.
As in the papers mentioned above, symmetry plays an important role in the analysis. It seems, however, that appropriate versions of Proposition 2.1 and Theorem 2.2 hold for asymmetric industries, although the proofs will be considerably more cumbersome.
The industry
Demand is known to all firms with certainty. Throughout it is assumed that the demand function D : R þ -R þ is twice continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing, and concave on ð0; rÞ; where r40 satisfies DðpÞ40 for por; and DðpÞ ¼ 0 for pXr: All firms have access to the same technology, and therefore have identical cost function, C : R-R; we assume that C is twice continuously differentiable, nondecreasing and convex on R þ ; and satisfies C 0 ð0Þor; and CðqÞ ¼ Cð0Þ for qo0: (Extending the domain of the cost function to include negative quantities is inconsequential and simplifies our analysis.) An industry is therefore described by a triple ðD; C; NÞ; indicating the market demand, D; the cost function, C; and the set of firms, N ¼ f1; y; ng where nX2: In what follows, let us be given an industry ðD; C; NÞ:
Competition via supply functions
Firms compete by simultaneously choosing a supply function, i.e., a nondecreasing real-valued function on ½0; r that is continuously differentiable on ð0; rÞ: For a profile of supply functions s ¼ ðs 1 ; y; s n Þ; a market clearing price is a solution to the equation X n i¼1 s i ðpÞ ¼ DðpÞ: ðMCÞ
Since the market demand is strictly decreasing and the supply function of each firm is non-decreasing, if a market clearing price exists, then it is unique. For each profile of supply functions s; let pðsÞ be the market clearing price if it exists, and let pðsÞ be zero if a market clearing price does not exist. The profit (payoff) of a firm iAN is given by p i ðsÞ ¼ pðsÞs i ðpðsÞÞ À Cðs i ðpðsÞÞÞ: (This construction implicitly assumes that when a market clearing price does not exist the revenue of every firm is zero.) A supply function equilibrium (SFE) is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the game described. Write SFEðD; C; NÞ for the set of supply function equilibria. In a SFE each firm maximizes profits on its ''residual demand''; that is, if sASFEðD; C; NÞ; then pðŝÞ ¼p solves 
Because the demand function is concave and the cost function is convex, if in addition eachŝ i is a convex function, then satisfying the system of equations formed by ðE 1 Þ; y; ðE n Þ and (MC) is a sufficient condition for a strategy profileŝ to be a SFE. Thus, every equilibrium outcome ðp; q 1 ; y; q n Þ such that 0opor must be a solution to the system of equations formed by ðE 1 Þ; y; ðE n Þ; and (MC), for some profile of supply functions s: For sASFEðD; C; NÞ; we denote by ðpðsÞ; q 1 ðsÞ; y; q n ðsÞÞ the associated equilibrium outcome.
Competitive and Cournot prices
In determining the market prices that can be sustained by SFE the competitive price and the Cournot price play an important role. In our framework each of these prices is a solution to a system of equations.
A Cournot outcome ð % p; % q 1 ; y; % q n Þ is characterized by the system of equations
Eq. ð % C1Þ ensures that the output of each firm maximizes its profits given the aggregate output of its rivals, whereas ð % C2Þ ensures that the market clears. Our assumptions on demand and cost functions imply the existence of a unique Cournot outcome, which is symmetric (i.e., satisfies % q 1 ¼ ? ¼ % q n Þ: (The Cournot equilibrium is unique and symmetric under much weaker assumptions on the curvature of demand and cost functions; see, e.g., [2] .) Given an industry ðD; C; NÞ; we denote by % pðD; C; NÞ and % qðD; C; NÞ the market price and the output of each firm, respectively, at the Cournot outcome.
A competitive equilibrium ð % p; % q 1 ; y; % q n Þ satisfies the system of equations
Our assumptions on demand and cost functions imply the existence of a unique competitive price, which we denote by % pðD; C; NÞ: Clearly 0p % pðD; C; NÞo % pðD; C; NÞor:
Results
Proposition 2.1 shows that if s is a SFE that leads to the Cournot price, then the outcome associated with s is the Cournot outcome. Moreover, in every SFE that sustains the Cournot outcome, the derivative of the supply function of every firm vanishes at the Cournot price. Proof. Let sASFEðD; C; NÞ be such that pðsÞ ¼ % pðD; C; NÞ ¼ % p: Since % pAð0; rÞ; s satisfies condition ðE i Þ for iAN: We show that s i ð % pÞ ¼ % qðD; C; NÞ ¼ % q for iAN: Assume by way of contradiction that there is a firm j such that s j ð % pÞa % q: Since P n i¼1 s i ð % pÞ ¼ Dð % pÞ ¼ n % q; assume without loss of generality that s j ð % pÞ ¼ q j o % q: Then, because D is decreasing, C is convex, and each s i is non-decreasing, we have
Thus, condition ðE j Þ is not satisfied, which is a contradiction. We show that s
Note that concavity of demand plays no role in the proof of Proposition 2.1. Next, we study the set of outcomes that can be sustained by SFE. Klemperer and Meyer [10] have shown that when supply functions are not restricted to be nondecreasing, then every outcome ðp; q 1 ; y; q n ÞAR n þ such that DðpÞ ¼ P n i¼1 q i and C 0 ðq i Þop for each iAN can be sustained by a SFE; in particular, the monopoly price can be sustained by SFE. Restricting supply functions to be non-decreasing significantly reduces this set; in particular, the monopoly price can no longer be sustained as a SFE.
Write SFE p ðD; C; NÞ for the set of prices that can be sustained by SFE, i.e., pASFE p ðD; C; NÞ if p ¼ pðsÞ for some sASFEðD; C; NÞ: Theorem 2.2 establishes that SFE p ðD; C; NÞ is the half open interval containing the prices between the competitive price and the Cournot price. 
and therefore 
Thus, condition ðE i Þ is not satisfied. Moreover, ifp ¼ 0 then we have p i ðŝÞ ¼ ÀCðq i Þo À Cð0Þ: HenceŝeSFEðD; C; NÞ: Finally, letŝ be such thatp4 % p40: We show thatŝeSFEðD; C; NÞ: Since D is strictly decreasing, we have DðpÞoDð % pÞ: Consequently, at least one firm iAN is producingŝ i ðpÞ ¼q i o % q ¼ % qðD; C; NÞ: Thus, sinceŝ 0 i ðpÞX0; for iAN; and
Hence condition ðE i Þ is not satisfied, and thereforeŝeSFEðD; C; NÞ: & Note that both concavity of demand and convexity of cost are used throughout the proof of Theorem 2.2. Also note that the construction in the proof of Theorem 2.2 establishes that every price between the competitive price and the Cournot price can be sustained by a symmetric SFE, whose associated outcome is therefore symmetric (i.e., all firms produce the same quantity). Nevertheless, there are asymmetric outcomes that can be sustained by SFE (see Example 3.6). It is also interesting to observe that in the SFE constructed in the proof of the Theorem 2.2, the parameter # a ranges from zero forp ¼ % p; to infinity asp approaches % p (becausê p À C 0 ðqÞ approaches zero). The following remark is a direct implication of Theorem 2.2.
Remark 2.3. For each sASFEðD; C; NÞ; we have pðsÞAð0; rÞ: Hence every SFE outcome is a solution to the system of equations ðE 1 Þ; y; ðE n Þ; (MC), for some profile s of supply functions.
We finish this section by showing in Proposition 2.4 that within the set of outcomes that can be sustained by SFE, the profit of the industry is uniquely ARTICLE IN PRESS maximized at the Cournot outcome. This result plays an important role in establishing in Section 3 that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a CPSFE. Proposition 2.4. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry, and let % s;ŝASFEðD; C; NÞ be such that pð% sÞ ¼ % pðD; C; NÞapðŝÞ:Then P n i¼1 p i ð% sÞ4 P n i¼1 p i ðŝÞ:
Proof. Write % pðD; C; NÞ ¼ % p; and for pAð0; rÞ; define
Since P is concave (because D and ÀC are concave), and
we have P 0 ðpÞ40 for 0opp % p: Therefore Pð % pÞ4PðpÞ for 0opo % p: Let % s;ŝASFEðD; C; NÞ be such that pð% sÞ ¼ % pap ¼ pðŝÞ: Then % p4p by Theorem 2.2. Further, q i ð% sÞ ¼ % qðD; C; NÞ ¼ Dð % pÞ n by Proposition 2.1, and since C is convex, we have
which establishes Proposition 2.4. &
The following remark, which a direct implication of Proposition 2.4, establishes that the Cournot outcome is not Pareto dominated by any other SFE outcome.
Remark 2.5. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry, and let % sASFEðD; C; NÞ be such that pð% sÞ ¼ % pðD; C; NÞ: Then there is nosASFEðD; C; NÞ satisfying p i ðsÞ4p i ð% sÞ for all iAN:
Coalition-proof supply function equilibria
In this section we introduce the notion of coalition-proof supply function equilibrium (CPSFE), and show that in our framework a CPSFE exists. Further, under appropriate conditions there is a unique CPSFE outcome. Remarkably, this outcome is the Cournot outcome. In both existence and uniqueness of CPSFE outcomes, restricting the supply functions of firms to be non-decreasing plays an essential role. We comment on this issue below. We also discuss in Section 3.4 the robustness of the uniqueness result to cost asymmetries.
The notion of CPSFE
In environments where players can freely discuss their strategies but cannot make binding commitments, viable agreements must be invulnerable to improving deviations by either individual players or coalitions of players. Thus, in these environments it is natural to ask which equilibria are ''coalition-proof.'' Indeed, this question has been studied in a variety of contexts, including political economy, social choice, and industrial organization-e.g., Bernheim and Whinston [4] , and Yi [13] study this issue in a variety of oligopolistic environments.
Several alternative notions of coalition-proof equilibrium have been proposed in the literature. Aumann [1] introduced the notion of strong Nash equilibrium, which requires that a strategy profile be invulnerable to all improving coalitional deviations. The notion of strong Nash equilibrium is often too strong. Many games fail to have equilibria of this kind: in a Prisoner's Dilemma game, for example, the unique Nash equilibrium is not strong because it is vulnerable to the deviation where both players choose the cooperative action; note, however, that this deviation is meaningless as it is itself vulnerable to a further improving deviation by either player.
We formalize the notion of coalition-proof supply function equilibrium (CPSFE henceforth), which is just an adaptation to our framework of the notion of coalitionproof Nash equilibrium introduced by Bernheim et al. [3] . A CPSFE is a profile of supply functions that is invulnerable to improving and self-enforcing deviations by any coalition of firms. A deviation is self-enforcing if there is no further selfenforcing improving deviation available to a proper subcoalition of the deviating coalition. Thus, following Bernheim et al. [3] we do not require that a profile of supply functions be invulnerable to all deviations, but just to those that are invulnerable to further self-enforcing deviations by proper subcoalitions. We begin by formally defining the notion of CPSFE.
Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry. We denote by 2 N the set of all possible coalitions. For a strategy profile s and a coalition MA2 N ; write s M for the profile of supply functions of the members of M; and write m for the cardinality of the set M: Let s be a strategy profile and let MA2 N ; 2pmon; be a coalition of firms (recall that nX2). Holding fixed the strategies of the members of the complementary coalition, s N\M ; the situation the group of firms in M faces can be modeled as that of an ''industry'' ðD s;M ; C; MÞ; where D s;M is given for pAR þ by This recursive structure allows us to formalize the notion of CPSFE.
Coalition-proof supply function equilibrium: Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry.
(1) If n ¼ 2; a strategy profile s is a coalition-proof supply function equilibrium if sASFEðD; C; NÞ and there is nosASFEðD; C; NÞ satisfying p i ðsÞ4p i ðsÞ for every iAN:
(2) Let n42 and assume that the notion of coalition-proof supply function equilibrium has been defined for industries with fewer than n firms.
(i) A strategy profile s is self-enforcing if sASFEðD; C; NÞ; and if for all MA2 N ; 2pmon; s M is a coalition-proof supply function equilibrium of the industry ðD s;M ; C; MÞ:
(ii) A strategy profile s is a coalition-proof supply function equilibrium if it is selfenforcing and if there is no self-enforcing strategy profiles such that p i ðsÞ4p i ðsÞ for every iAN:
The definition of CPSFE applies to industries with no fewer than two firms. Note that a CPSFE is a SFE, and therefore it is invulnerable to deviations by a single firm. Given an industry ðD; C; NÞ; write CPSFEðD; C; NÞ for the set of supply function equilibria.
Existence of CPSFE
Since there are no general results on the existence of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, we begin by establishing in Theorem 3.1 that every industry has a CPSFE. (Moreno and Wooders [12] provide conditions on the set of iteratively undominated strategies that guarantee existence of a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. In our framework, iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies will not take us very far.) Theorem 3.1. Every industry has a coalition-proof supply function equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1 is a direct implication of Proposition 3.2 below, which establishes that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a CPSFE. The proof of Proposition 3.2 relies on the recursive structure of Cournot equilibrium. The argument of the proof is analogous to that used by Bernheim and Whinston [4] to establish that in an industry (as the one described here) where firms compete a`la Cournot, the unique equilibrium is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Since in our context we have multiplicity of equilibria, our proof relies on the fact that the Cournot outcome is on the Pareto frontier of the set of SFE outcomes (see Remark 2.5). Thus, restricting the supply functions of firms to be non-decreasing plays an essential role in this argument. Indeed, if this restriction is removed, then the monopoly outcome where firms share the market equally arises as a SFE outcome-see [10] -and therefore the Cournot outcome is no longer on the Pareto frontier of the set of SFE outcomes. Proposition 3.2. The Cournot outcome can be sustained by a CPSFE. Moreover, every SFE that yields the Cournot outcome is a CPSFE.
Proof. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry, and let sASFEðD; C; NÞ be such that pðsÞ ¼ % pðD; C; NÞ ¼ % p and q i ðsÞ ¼ % qðD; C; NÞ ¼ % q for iAN: (The existence of a SFE leading to the Cournot outcome is guaranteed by Theorem 2.2 and Proposition 2.1.) We show by induction on the number of firms that sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ: If n ¼ 2; then sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ follows from Remark 2.5. Let n42; and assume that sACPSFEðD; C; KÞ whenever 2pkon: We show that sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ: Note that for MA2 N such that 2pmok the Cournot outcome of the industry ðD s;M ; C; MÞ is also ð % p; % q; y; % qÞ; hence the induction hypothesis implies s M ACPSFEðD s;M ; C; MÞ: Since sASFEðD; C; NÞ; s is self-enforcing. Moreover, since any other self-enforcing strategys is a member of SFEðD; C; NÞ; sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ follows from Remark 2.5. &
Uniqueness of CPSFE outcomes
Next, we establish conditions under which the Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome. We show that when the number of firms in the industry is above a threshold, the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to every other SFE outcome (i.e., the profits of every firm at the Cournot outcome are greater than at every other SFE outcome). Thus, any CPSFE leading to the Cournot outcome, which exist by Proposition 3.2, is a self-enforcing and improving deviation of the grand coalition to every SFE leading to an outcome other than the Cournot outcome. Hence the Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome.
In proving that the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to every other SFE outcome, a particular class of SFE plays an important role. In this class all but perhaps one firm supply inelastically the same fixed amount, and the remaining firm maximizes on the residual demand. (The Cournot outcome, in particular, can be sustained by a SFE in this class.) The SFE outcomes in this class are solutions to a simple system of equations, and can be parametrized by the slope of the supply function of the firm maximizing on the residual demand, evaluated at the market clearing price.
We show that for every SFE,ŝ; one can find a SFE in this class,s; for which the profits of the firms using an inelastic supply function (say firms 1 to n À 1) are greater or equal to those obtained by the firm with the greatest profits in the original SFE (i.e., p 1 ðsÞ ¼ ? ¼ p nÀ1 ðsÞXmaxfp 1 ðŝÞ; y; p n ðŝÞg). This key result is established in Proposition 3.3. As a direct consequence of this result, when the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to every other outcome in this class, it is in fact Pareto superior to every other SFE outcome, and is therefore the unique CPSFE outcome (Proposition 3.4).
Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry. Consider the outcomes that can be sustained by sASFEðD; C; NÞ for which there is jAN such that s i ðpÞ ¼ vAR þ for each iAN\f jg and pA½0; r: Writing pðsÞ ¼ u; and s j ðuÞ ¼ w; we can obtain these outcomes ðu; v; wÞAR for aAR þ : (In system ðEðaÞÞ; the parameter a is the slope of the supply function of firm j; the firm using an elastic supply, evaluated at the market clearing price.) System ðEðaÞÞ implicitly defines a function ðuðaÞ; vðaÞ; wðaÞÞ on ½0; NÞ that is continuously differentiable on ð0; NÞ: (In the proof of Proposition 3.3, given in the appendix, we show that fixing the production of a firm with the greatest production in an arbitrary SFE, vAR þ ; system ðEðaÞÞ has a unique solution, ðuðvÞ; wðvÞ; aðvÞÞ: Moreover, a 0 40; and therefore the function a is invertible.) Define the function p on ½0; NÞ by pðaÞ ¼ uðaÞvðaÞ À CðvðaÞÞ:
Note that p is continuously differentiable on ð0; NÞ:
For aX0 denote by SFE a ðD; C; NÞ the set of SFE of the form described above. Every sASFE a ðD; C; NÞ leads to an outcome given by pðsÞ ¼ uðaÞ; q i ðsÞ ¼ vðaÞ for iAN\f jg; and q j ðsÞ ¼ wðaÞ: The function pðaÞ provides the profits of the firms using an inelastic supply. Note that for a ¼ 0 system ðEðaÞÞ reduces to Eqs. ð % C1Þ and ð % C2Þ; and therefore the outcome associated with every sASFE 0 ðD; C; NÞ is the Cournot outcome. Hence pð0Þ ¼ % pðD; C; NÞ % qðD; C; NÞ À Cð % qðD; C; NÞÞ: Proposition 3.3 establishes the key result mentioned above. Its proof involves tedious calculations, and it is relegated to the appendix. In the proof we use the assumption that the cost function is thrice continuously differentiable and that its third derivative is non-negative. As shown in the proof, an implication of this assumption is that SFE are not ''very asymmetric'', a condition that guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in the class described above that satisfies certain properties. This assumption is also needed in Proposition 3.4 (whose proof appeals to Proposition 3.3), and is satisfied under the conditions imposed in Theorems 3.5 and 3.7 (which proofs appeal to Proposition 3.4). Proposition 3.3. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry such that C is thrice continuously differentiable and satisfies C 000 ðqÞX0 for q40: IfŝASFEðD; C; NÞ is such that pðŝÞa % pðD; C; NÞ; then there is a40 satisfying pðaÞXmaxfp 1 ðŝÞ; y; p n ðŝÞg:
Proposition 3.4 establishes that if the function p of an industry ðD; C; NÞ reaches a maximum at a ¼ 0; then the Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome. This fact is a straightforward implication of Propositions 3.2 and 3.3.
Proposition 3.4. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry such that C is thrice continuously differentiable and satisfies C 000 ðqÞX0 for q40: If pð0Þ4pðaÞ for all aAð0; NÞ; then ðpðsÞ; q 1 ðsÞ; y; q n ðsÞÞ ¼ ð % pðD; C; NÞ; % qðD; C; NÞ; y; % qðD; C; NÞÞ for all sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ:
Proof. Denote % pðD; C; NÞ ¼ % p and % qðD; C; NÞ ¼ % q: Let sASFEðD; C; NÞ be such that ðpðsÞ; q 1 ðsÞ; y; q n ðsÞÞað % p; % q; y; % qÞ: We show that seCPSFEðD; C; NÞ: ; where a; bAR þ ), and a linear cost function (i.e., CðqÞ ¼ cq; for qX0; where cAR þ ). Our assumption that C 0 ð0Þor amounts to assuming co a b : Thus, a linear industry is described by the parameters a; b; c; and n: Theorem 3.5 establishes that if there are three or more firms in a linear industry the Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome. We obtain this result by directly calculating the function p; and appealing to Proposition 3.4. Hence p 0 ðaÞo0 on ð0; NÞ; and therefore pð0Þ4pðaÞ for aAð0; NÞ: Thus, the conclusion of Theorem 3.5 follows from Proposition 3.4. & Note that in an industry where there are only two firms the Stackelberg outcomes are in the Pareto frontier of the set of SFE outcomes, and are therefore CPSFE outcomes. By Theorem 3.5, however, in a linear industry the presence of three or more firms reduces the set of CPSFE outcomes to just the Cournot outcome. Theorem 3.7 below establishes that in fact this conclusion extends to every industry ðD; C; NÞ with a quadratic cost function and linear demand. Nevertheless, as Example 3.6 shows, there are industries with three firms for which outcomes other than the Cournot outcome can be sustained by CPSFE. Example 3.6. Consider the industry where DðpÞ ¼ 1 À p 2 for pA½0; 1; CðqÞ ¼ 0 for qAR; and N ¼ f1; 2; 3g: From the solution to system ðEðaÞÞ one can compute the function p to obtain
ARTICLE IN PRESS
This function is uniquely maximized at a Ã ¼ : We show sACPSFEðD; C; NÞ: Since pð 1 3 ÞXpðaÞ for aX0; by Proposition 3.3 s is Pareto superior to every other SFE outcome. Hence the coalition of all three firms does not have a self-enforcing and improving deviation. In addition, the two firms producing 1 3 are in fact at the Cournot outcome of the ''residual industry'' (fixing the production of the remaining firm to be 2 9 ), and therefore by Proposition 3.2 this coalition does not have an improving self-enforcing deviation either. Nor does a coalition formed by a firm producing 1 3 and the firm producing 2 9 have an improving self-enforcing deviation, since these productions correspond to a Stackelberg outcome of their residual industry. Hence s is a CPSFE.
Let D and C be the demand and cost functions of an industry. Denote by n Ã the smallest integer such that
Under appropriate conditions on the functions D and C; n Ã provides a threshold for the number of firms which guarantees that if nXn Ã ; then the Cournot outcome is the unique outcome that can be sustained by a CPSFE. Note that under our assumptions of demand and cost n Ã 42: Further, if demand is linear, then n Ã ¼ 3: Also note that for the industry in Example 3.6 we have
Indeed, in this industry pð0Þ4pðaÞ for a40 whenever there are four or more firms (and therefore by Proposition 3.4 the Cournot outcome is the unique outcome that can be sustained by a CPSFE). Theorem 3.7 establishes more general conditions than those of Theorem 3.5 under which the Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome. The following lemma provides alternative conditions that ensure that the function p has a unique maximum on a ¼ 0: These conditions are useful in the proof of Theorem 3.7. The proof of this lemma is given in the appendix. With these results in hand we can now prove Theorem 3.7.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. We show that under either of the assumptions of Theorem 3.7 condition (1) of Lemma 3.8 is satisfied, and therefore that pð0Þ4pðaÞ for a40: The conclusion of Theorem 3.7 then follows from Proposition 3.4.
Suppose that (1) (1) and (2) of Lemma 3.8 directly allows us to establish that the Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome for a quadratic industry (Example 3.9), and for an industry where the cost function is quadratic and the demand is a polynomial of third order (Example 3.10). These examples are outside the scope of Theorem 3.7.
Example 3.9. Consider an industry where DðpÞ ¼ 1 À p 2 for pA½0; 1; CðqÞ ¼ 1 2 q 2 for qX0; and N ¼ f1; 2; 3g: For this industry, the Cournot outcome is the unique outcome that can be sustained by a CPSFE. We show that (1) 
hence (1) of Lemma 3.8 does not hold. Nonetheless, it is easy to prove that (2) of Theorem 3.7 holds. Write
We show gðaÞp0: One can compute gð0Þ (see the appendix) to obtain 
Uniqueness and cost asymmetries
In this section we discuss the robustness of the uniqueness result in the context of a simple linear asymmetric industry with three firms. We show that if marginal costs are sufficiently asymmetric there are multiple CPSFE outcomes. We also show that when firms' costs are nearly symmetric, the Pareto superiority of the Cournot outcome is preserved. Hence the result that the Cournot outcome is the unique CPSFE outcome is robust to cost asymmetries. (Actually, we prove that the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to every outcome generated by a SFE in the class SFE a ðD; C 1 ; C 2 ; C 3 ; f1; 2; 3gÞ with a40; described in Section 3.3. Establishing uniqueness of CPSFE formally requires showing that Proposition 3.3 holds for this industry if costs are nearly symmetric. The proof of this result is cumbersome, and we omit it.)
Consider a linear industry where there are three firms whose cost functions are C 1 ðqÞ ¼ 0; and C 2 ðqÞ ¼ C 3 ðqÞ ¼ cq; with 0pcp ; we have # p 1 À % p 1 40; i.e., the Cournot outcome is not Pareto superior to the outcome generated by the SFEŝ described above. Indeed, it is easy to see that if c ¼ 1 6 the profileŝ is a CPSFE-this can be shown by an argument similar to that used in Example 3.6 above.
For values of c near zero, however, the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to the outcome generated byŝ (i.e., % p i 4 # p i for iAN). Moreover, for values of c near zero the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to all the outcomes generated by SFE in the class SFE a ðD; C 1 ; C 2 ; C 3 ; NÞ with a40: To see this, note that in this industry with cost asymmetries we must consider two types of SFE in the class SFE a ðD; C 1 ; C 2 ; C 3 ; NÞ; namely, (a) those in which firms 1 and 2 (or 1 and 3) act as leaders, competing a´la Cournot, and firm 3 (2) behaves as a follower, and (b) those where firms 2 and 3 act as leaders, competing a´la Cournot, and firm 1 behaves as a follower.
For each type of SFE, (a) and (b), by solving the appropriate version of system of equations ðEðaÞÞ we can calculate the profits of the leaders (as a function of a; the slope of the followers supply) and c (the marginal cost of firms 1 and 2). For the SFE of type (a) system ðE a ðaÞÞ is
At these equilibria the profits of the leaders, say firms 1 and 2, are 
For values of c near zero both these functions are decreasing in a; and therefore the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to the outcomes generated by these equilibria. Again for values of c near zero this function is decreasing in a; and therefore the Cournot outcome is Pareto superior to the outcomes generated by these equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Let ðD; C; NÞ be an industry such that C 000 ðqÞX0 for q40 and letŝASFEðD; C; NÞ: Write % pðD; C; NÞ ¼ % p; % qðD; C; NÞ 
by condition ðE i Þ: Hence for iAN we havê
Thus, sincep maximizes the profits of firm 1 on the residual demand, we havê pXC 0 ðq 1 Þ; and therefore
Letp be such that DðpÞ À ðn À 1Þq 1 ¼ 0; and for uA½p;p define We show that the second term is also non-negative. Sinceq 1 Xq i for i41; we havê q i ¼ DðpÞ À P jaiq j XDðpÞ À ðn À 1Þq 1 ¼q for i41: Thus, for i41 there is l i A½0; 1 such thatq i ¼ l iq1 þ ð1 À l i Þq: Hencê 
ARTICLE IN PRESS

